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STATUTES SUBJECT TO INTERPRETATION
1.

Utah Code Ann.

§ 49-9-17 and § 49-10-6(22) and (23)

with the changes mandated by House Bill 299 (L. 1985, ch. 108)
bracketed and underlined.

(Pursuant to a recodification of the entire

retirement code pursuant to Chapter 1, Laws of Utah 1987, the current
definitions of "compensation" and "final average salary" are found in
Sections 49-2-103(1) and (5) for the Public Employees' (contributory)
Retirement Act, and Sections 49-3-103(1) and (6) for the Public
Employees' Noncontributory Retirement Act).
49-9-17. Limitation on final average salary in computation
of retirement benefits. In the administration of the state
retirement systems assigned to the Utah State Retirement
Office for administration, the following policies^ among
others-shaH] apply:
(a) Final average salary used in the computation of a
retirement benefit shall be based upon the fixed compensation regularly paid to the member over the period of time
specified in the retirement system act under which the
benefit is being computed. It shall not include
[overtime? doable time? or] terminal lump-sum payments,
accumulated lump-sum vacation or sick leave payments,
severance pay, bonuses, or any other special payments
including early retirement inducements, except as provided
to the contrary in the laws governing the separate retirement systems, nor shall the contributions paid by the
employer and employee to the retirement systems be based
upon any of the aforementioned special payments in the
last year of service.
(b) This policy on the computation of final average
salary shall take precedence over any and all definitions
of final average salary included in any and all state
retirement system acts administered by the Utah State
Retirement Office.

-iii-

49-10-6. Definitions
(22) "Compensation," "salary," or "wages" means the
total amount of payments made by an employer to an
employee for services rendered to the employer^ inelading? bat not by way of limitation? all salary? wage and
overtime payments? bat exclading] which by its nature
j_2 subject to social security deductions, including
any payments in excess of the maximum amount subject
to deduction under social security law. "Compensation,"
"salary," or "wages" does not include: (a) the monetary
value of remuneration paid in kind, such as residence
or use of equipment^ [and] (b) all contributions made
by an employer under this plan or under any other
employee benefit plan maintained by an employer for
the benefit of a participant^ (c) salary paid to an^
employee working under the minimum number of hours
required for membership; (d) a temporary or exempt
employee as defined by this section or Section 49-10-14;
or XiLl terminal lump sum payments, accumulated lump
sum vacation, sick leave payments, severance pay, or
any other special payments including early retirement
inducements.
(23) "Final average salary" means the rate of the
average highest annual compensation payable to a member
for any five years preceding retirement. For purposes
of computing the member's final average salary only,
the member is considered to have been in service at his
last salary rate from the date of the termination of
employment to the date [his] retirement becomes effective if the member so requests. If participating
service is less than five years, then "final average
salary" means the average annual compensation paid
to the member during the full period of participating
service.[ft does not inclade for any member compensation received for either part-time or special serviee
rendered in conjanetion with fall time employment
anless eontribations have been paid on compensation
received for sach additional servicer] The "final
average salary" is limited in the computation of that
part of a member's prior service retirement allowance
based on service rendered during a period when the
[said] member received employer contributions on a
portion of his compensation from an educational
institution toward the payment of the premium required on a retirement annuity contract with the
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Teachers' Insurance and Annuity Association of
America or with any other public or private system,
organization or company to $4,800. This limitation
is not applicable to members who elected to continue
in the state retirement system by July 1, 1967. The
retirement board shall, before July 1, 1979, adjust
the retirement allowance of any member who retired
before July 1, 1979. "Average final monthly salary"
means one-twelfth of the final average salary.
Utah Code Annotated, § 49-9-19, enacted by L. 1986, ch 71.
49-9-19. Refunds of vested contributions—Time restrictions—Limitations on refunds.
(1) Refunds of vested contributions made pursuant to law
in any retirement system to which the contributions were
made may not be made prior to 60 days from the last day
the contributions were made, and only upon the termination
of the member.
(2) No refund may be made to an active member of any
retirement system administered by the board unless the
board determines that the member has service credit,
which, if calculated on its own, would render that member
ineligible for membership in the retirement system.

-v-

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED
Does the action of the Legislature in using contributions paid
on secondary employment compensation to enhance retirement benefits
for Plaintiffs, active members of the State Retirement System, violate
any vested right or constitute a denial of equal protection of the laws
under the Utah and United States Constitutions.

ACTION OF THE COURT BELOW
This case was heard by the Honorable James S. Sawaya, Judge of
the Third District Court, on June 8, 1987, upon Plaintiffs' Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment and Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.

Judge

Sawaya entered judgment for Defendant and Plaintiffs' thereafter filed
their Notice of Appeal.

-1-

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Plaintiffs are members of the Utah State Retirement System.

As such, they are entitled to a retirement benefit upon meeting and
fulfilling all statutory requirements for receiving a retirement
benefit.

In the case of all of these plaintiffs, the retirement

statutes, which at the time of the controversy in issue were codified
under Chapters 9 and 10, Title 49, Utah Code Anotated, 1953, specified
that the retirement benefit would be based upon plaintiffs' "final
average salary" multiplied by the number of years of service credited
to the members.
2.

In order to secure a retirement benefit, plaintiffs and their

employers contribute a statutorily established amount to the retirement
office to cover the costs of providing the benefit.

This contribution

amount is based upon the "compensation" received by the member and the
"final average salary" is computed using "compensation" received by the
plaintiffs over a period of time.
3.

This controversy has arisen over the definitions of "final

average salary" and "compensation."
4.

Prior to March 16, 1985, in a provision governing all

retirement systems, the definition of "final average salary" did not
include overtime, double-time, or terminal lump sum payments,
accumulated lumpsum, vacation or sick leave payments, severance
pay, bonuses, or any other special payments, including early
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retirement inducements, nor were contributions made by the employers
and employees to the retirement system to be based on any of these
aforementioned special payments in the last year of service.

Utah Code

Ann. § 49-9-17.
5.

During the same time in question prior to 1985, in the Utah

State Retirement System, which governed the retirement benefit for the
Plaintiffs, "final average salary" did not include compensation received
for either part-time or special service rendered in conjunction with
full-time employment unless contributions to the retirement system were
paid on compensation received for this part-time or special service.
Utah Code Ann., § 49-10-6(23).
6.

The term "compensation" was defined as the total amount of

payments made by an employer to an employee for services rendered to an
employer, including all salary, wage and overtime payments.

Utah Code

Ann. § 49-10-6(22).
7.

In fulfilling its statutory mandate to implement retirement

statutes enacted by the Legislature, the retirement board in a 1983
resolution, "Dual Employment With Same Employer" established a policy
whereby retirement contributions would be withheld only upon employment compensation related to the member's normal occupation, and not
upon totally unrelated employment compensation.

However, secondary

employment which was related to the normal occupation of the member
would be considered regular employment and contributions to the system
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would be made on compensation received from that employment.

If,

for some reason, contributions on the "unrelated" employment compensation were withheld, a member could receive a refund by furnishing
written documentation establishing the unrelated nature of the employment.
8.

Then, one year after the passage of the 1983 resolution, the

1984 Legislature enacted legislation, the primary purpose of which was
to financially reward teachers for taking additional assignments and
work performed.

This type of compensation, commonly known as "Teacher

Career Ladders" and codified at Utah Code Ann. § 53-54-1, did not easily
fit into the current definition of "compensation" under the resolution
adopted by the retirement board.

Thus, in November of 1984, the board

adopted a replacement resolution expanding its policy set forth in the
1983 resolution on secondary employment.

This 1984 resolution

established that retirement contributions would be taken only on the
primary employment of a member, which, in the case of teachers, would
be determined by the primary contract.

All secondary employment

unrelated to the primary contract, such as career ladder programs,
summer school, coaching, or other extracurricular assignments for which
compensation is paid, would not be subject to retirement contributions.
9.

As to refunds of contributions, the 1984 resolution established

that no refund would be authorized by the board on secondary employment
contributions unless the employer certified in writing that, as of an
established date, no more contributions would be paid on that compensation.
-4-

10.

As is usual and customary in situations involving difficulties

in interpreting legislative intent in any particular retirement statute,
the retirement office informed the legislature of the need to clarify
legislative intent with respect to the definition of compensation, particularly in terms of compensation subject to contributions and compensation eligible for inclusion in the final average salary computation.
11.

The 1985 Legislature adopted House Bill 299 "RETIREMENT LAW

AMENDMENTS" by Representative Rob W. Bishop.

This bill, effective

March 16, 1985, established the compensation upon which a member's
final average salary would be calculated.

This new definition,

codified at Utah Code Ann. § 49-10-6(22), focuses on compensation in
relation to amounts subject to social security deductions.

Specifi-

cally, the term compensation is defined as the total amount of payments
made by an employer to an employee for services rendered to the employer
which by its nature is subject to social security deductions, including
any payments in excess of the maximum amount subject to deduction under
social security law.
12.

For the third time in as many years, the retirement board

adopted a resolution on this subject, this time to implement the H.B.
299 definition of compensation, and in particular, to address the
question of refunding contributions.
(a)

The board first noted that:

refunds on contributions for dual or supplemental

service accrued prior to the effective date of H.B. 299,
was not authorized by law;
-5-

(b)

refunds of this nature would place the retirement

system in an actuarially unsound position; and
(c)

the new definition of compensation would benefit

all future retirees, inasmuch as all service and compensation would be included in the calculation of the final
average salary, including the contributions paid on the
extra service performed.
As a result of these findings, the board rescinded its action in
the 1984 resolution and determined that no refunds would be given on
contributions for dual or supplemental service.
13.

At this point, forms were provided by the retirement office

to refund contributions which were made on compensation which is
ineligible for the additional benefits granted by the new definition
of compensation under H.B. 299.
14.

The 1986 Legislature confirmed the application of this refund

policy in 1986 by enacting House Bill 161, REFUNDS OF RETIREMENT
CONTRIBUTIONS, again by Representative Rob W. Bishop.

This legislation,

effective March 17, 1986, stated that no refund could be made to an
active member of any retirement system administered by the board unless
the member has service credit which, if calculated on its own, would
render that member ineligible for membership in the retirement system.
15.

Forms are available at the retirement office for plaintiffs

and all other members of the system who may have refundable contributions, to seek refunds of those contributions under current law.

Other-

wise, the contributions will be used to enhance the retirement benefit
upon retirement in accordance with the statutory formula.
-6-

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Plaintiffs, as active, contributing members of the system, have
no vested right to a calculation of their benefit with anything but the
compensation used in determining their benefit at the date of their
retirement.

The 1985 legislative enactment (H.B. 299) establishes

these rights and is a reasonable and fair classification of members of
the system for purposes of a legitimate state objective - clarifying
a confusing and unfair situation with respect to contributions on compensation.

Even if plaintiffs had a vested right to the pre- 1985

compensation calculation, the legislature provided a substantial substitute for the loss of those contributions by allowing an enhanced
retirement benefit, or a refund of contributions, depending upon the
type of service performed by plaintiffs.
ARGUMENT
I
PLAINTIFFS HAVE NO VESTED RIGHT TO BOTH A REFUND
OF THEIR CONTRIBUTIONS AND HAVE THE COMPENSATION ON
WHICH THE CONTRIBUTIONS WERE MADE INCLUDED IN THE
CALCULATION OF THE FINAL AVERAGE SALARY. THUS,
EXISTING RETIREMENT STATUTES GOVERN PLAINTIFFS'
RIGHTS IN THIS CASE.
Plaintiffs have not argued that the legislature cannot change the
definition of compensation.

Far from it - they admit that "the 1985

act eliminated much of the problem created by the earlier laws and
practices of the state retirement system ..."

(Appellant's Brief at

p. 5 ) . It appears that Plaintiffs' problems rest not so much with the
1985 Legislature's redefinition of compensation, but with the fact that
-7-

each individual plaintiff may not take advantage of this change in the
law without immediately retiring.

This argument is based on the erron-

eous assumption that plaintiffs have a vested right to have their
retirement benefit calculated using the pre-1985 definition of compensation, no matter how many years away from retirement they may be.
In truth, some benefits do vest to the members' benefit, but they
do so at the point in time each individual plaintiff meets the qualifications for receiving a retirement benefit.

This principle was clearly

established by this Court in Driggs v. Utah State Teachers' Retirement
Board, 142 P.2d 657 (1943).

In Driggs, the Legislature enacted a

law which diminished the benefit of a retired member of the Teachers'
Retirement System.

The retired member had fulfilled all the statutory

prerequisites to obtaining a retirement benefit and the Court held that
the Legislature could not diminish his benefit by a subsequent
enactment.
Plaintiffs have not fulfilled the statutory requirements in this
case.

They are active, contributing members, and as the Court in Driggs

stated:

"It should be noted that until all of the conditions are ful-

filled, the pensioner's right is inchoate and not vested."

k L at 663.

Because plaintiffs rights are not vested, they are subject to
adjustments.
pensation.

In 1985, the legislature amended the definition of comIn 1986, the legislature enacted Utah Code Ann. § 49-9-19(2)

which states:

"No refund may be made to any active member of any

retirement system administered by the board unless the board determines
that the member has service credit, which, if calculated on its own,
-8-

would render that member ineligible for membership in the retirement
system."

Plaintiffs are subject to these provisions.

Read together,

the 1985 and 1986 legislative enactments cited above make it crystal
clear that the retirement board has no authority to refund any contribution based on secondary employment unless (a) that compensation alone
would render the member ineligible for membership in the system, and
(b) that compensation is, by its nature, not subject to social security
deductions.
To illustrate the application of these new laws, consider a
Plaintiff teacher who, as secondary employment during the summer,
entered into a contract to do some painting for the state.

If con-

tributions or compensation received from this contractual secondary
employment were paid, the Plaintiff teacher can seek a refund of those
contributions.
Conversely, if the contribution on compensation received was. by
its nature, subject to social security deductions, as in the case of a
Plaintiff teacher who received extra compensation under the "Teacher
Career Ladder" plan, then that additional compensation is included in
the calculation of the final average salary.

By adopting the social

security standard for determining compensation, the legislature significantly enhanced the retirement benefit for all employees, Plaintiffs
included, by allowing certain portions of their secondary employment to
be included in the compensation received for purposes of determining
the final average salary, and consequently, the retirement benefit
itself.

Contributions on compensation not used in the calculation of

the final average salary are refunded to the employee in accordance with
law.

Under either scenario Plaintiffs are not harmed.
-9-

ARGUMENT
II.
EVEN IF THE PLAINTIFFS HAVE A VESTED RIGHT TO A
BENEFIT CALCULATION UPON RETIREMENT BASED UPON
PRE-1985 LAW, A SUBSTANTIAL SUBSTITUTE WAS PROVIDED
BY THE 1985 ENACTMENT.
Even if we were to assume, arguendo, that the right to a refund
or to have the secondary employment compensation included in the
calculation of the final average salary is a vested right, the
Legislature has provided a substantial substitute for this through the
enactment of the 1985 act.
This "substantial substitute" doctrine, first enunciated by this
Court in Newcomb v. Ogden City Public School Teachers Retirement
Commission, 243 P.2d 941 (1952), establishes that the legislature cannot take away vested rights unless it offers a substantial substitute.
In this case, a substantial substitute is clearly identified by
the legislature.

The benefit of any Plaintiff who has secondary employ-

ment compensation which, by its nature, is subject to social security
deductions, will have that compensation used in calculating final
average salary and will "substantially" enhance his benefit.
ARGUMENT
III.
BOTH THE LEGISLATURE. IN ENACTING THE DEFINITION OF
COMPENSATION, AND THE BOARD, IN APPLYING THE LAW TO
PLAINTIFFS, HAVE TREATED SIMILARLY SITUATED INDIVIDUALS IN THE SAME MANNER, AND THUS NO VIOLATION OF
PLAINTIFFS' RIGHTS TO EQUAL PROTECTION HAS OCCURRED.
-10-

The 1985 legislative enactment creates a clear distinction between
two classes of members under the retirement system.

The first class is

comprised of those members who have secondary employment and have paid
contributions on compensation received from that employment, which compensation would, by its nature, be subject to social security deductions.

These members will have that compensation used in the calcula-

tion of the final average salary and thus, they will receive a significantly enhanced retirement benefit.

Utah Code Ann. § 49-10-6(22).

The second class is comprised of those members who have secondary
employment and have paid contributions on that employment, which, standing alone, would render the member ineligible for membership in the
retirement system and which, by its nature, is not subject to social
security deductions.

These members will not have the secondary employ-

ment compensation used in calculating the final average salary.
Instead, they receive a refund of those contributions in accordance
with law.
Two cases decided by this Court have discussed the issue of classification in a retirement system setting.

The first case, Hansen v.

Public Employees' Retirement System Board of Administration, 246 P.2d
591 (1952) involved a classification of employees for purposes of
liquidating the public employees retirement system.

The particular

challenge in Hansen was based upon the legislature's differentiation,
for benefit purposes, between members with ten or more years of service,
and those with less than ten years of service.

The Plaintiff Hansen

claimed that the classification was unreasonably discriminatory and,
therefore, unconstitutional.

The Hansen Court upheld the legislative

classification and held:
-11-

As to discrimination: An act is never unconstitutional because of discrimination so long as there
is some reasonable basis for differentiation
between classes which is related to the purposes
to be accomplished by the act. And it applies
uniformly to all members within the class. Id. at 597
While the Court noted that the legislature could differentiate
between members of a retirement system based on length of service, it
also listed other important factors which the legislature could properly
consider in making classifications, and included in these were administrative convenience and expense,

Id. at 598.

Similarly in this case, the legislature made a classification of
members of the system for "compensation" purposes, not on the basis of
the length of service performed, as in Hansen, but on the type of
employment performed.

The affidavit of the retirement director esta-

blishes that enormous expense and administrative inconvenience would
be involved in providing for refunds to Plaintiffs.

Thus, Hansen

provides clear precedent for the legislature's classification scheme
in this case.
The second case, Bryson v. Utah State Retirement Office, 573 P.2d
1280 (1978), involved a similar equal protection challenge brought by
a number of police officers and firefighters seeking a refund of contributions made to their respective retirement systems.

This challenge was

based on the legislative establishment of different retirement systems
with different refund provisions for each system, with plaintiffs'
system mandating a lesser refund to plaintiffs' system than those in
the other systems.
-12-

Again, the Utah Supreme Court upheld the legislative classification, stating:
It is recognized that this setting up of the four
separate retirement systems does divide public
employees into separate classes and treats each
class differently. But it is a well established
principle of law that people may thus be divided
into classes, if that classification bears some
reasonable relationship to the objective sought
to be accomplished; and there is no invidious
discrimination so long as all persons within the
same class are treated the same way. k L at 1282.
Similarly here, the objective sought to be accomplished by the
passage of the 1985 act was a clarification of statutes and board
interpretations which had theretofore been confusing and unfair.

This

was well within the legislative prerogative and affects all Plaintiffs
in the same way, whether they are in the first or the second class
established for "compensation" purposes.

CONCLUSION
It is unfortunate that this question could not be resolved administratively.

Plaintiffs request that they be allowed to have, at their

option, either a refund of contributions with interest, or an inclusion
of the compensation on which the contributions were made included in the
calculation of the final average salary.

In other words, they would

like to "have their cake and eat it too."
Even if the board refunds their contributions, it does not change
the application of the 1985 enactment to plaintiffs, and therefore, they
would have a double benefit while only contributing for one benefit.
The 1985 Legislature recognized the problems with the definition of
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compensation and its application to the final average salary calculation and changed that application prospectively to all active members
of the system.

This has resulted in a classification of members which

is both reasonable and fair.

Additional benefits have been granted

using this new approach, and will be paid for by contributions made to
the system in the past and contributions to be made in the future.
This is consistent with statutory and case law, and is not violative of
either Plaintiffs1 rights to equal protection or any other vested right
held by Plaintiffs under the system.
Based on the foregoing, Defendants respectfully request that the
judgment below be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

ManK A. Madsen
Attorney for Respondent
Utj4h State Retirement Board
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